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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we will present an overview of the patented OS
Friendly Microprocessor Architecture (OSFA) and introduce its
cyber security features. We are interested in feedback from cyber
security professionals, microprocessor developers, and operating
system (OS) developers about the hardware computer security
features in the OSFA.
The OS Friendly Microprocessor Architecture is based on a cache
bank memory pipeline. The cache banks and memory cells
incorporate Unix-like file permission bits to create a hardware level
computer security mechanism. A trusted OS and OSFA hardware
system form a separation kernel. The trusted OS configures the
security tags (access permission bits) for each cache bank. Any
attempt to access a resource outside the bounds of the sandbox
defined by the security tags raises a hardware exception handled by
the trusted OS.
We present our plans for developing a field programmable gate
array (FPGA) softcore OSFA based on the RISC-V architecture for
test and evaluation.

Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.5.3 Computer Systems Organization – Computer Systems
Implementation

General Terms
Performance, Design, Security.

Keywords
Cyber security, computer architecture, hardware computer security,
trust, privacy.

1. INTRODUCTION
The 1970’s telephone network used in-band signaling where
control information (tones) and data (voice) where combined
together. There was no authentication of control information. The
papers by Weaver et al. [1], and Breen et al. [2] provided the
technical details of the telephone network control system. Any
electronics hobbyist could easily build a blue box [3] to control the
telephone network. A blue box built by Steve Wozniak is on
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display at the Computer History Museum [4]. The 70’s telephone
network is a good example (oxymoron?) of how not to build a
secure system. Control information must be separated and isolated
from untrusted software and untrusted users.
In the current architectures from well-known vendors, such as Intel
[5], AMD, ARM, et al., there are no mechanisms to separate shared
resources across executing threads and processes. A virtual
machine (hypervisor) can provide a security layer; however,
traditional hypervisors are slow and have limitations.
The goal of the OSFA [6-7] is to create an architecture where
control information is isolated from untrusted users and untrusted
software. As long as the untrusted software does not exceed the
limits set by the hardware security mechanism, the software will
run with no performance overhead.
Microprocessor designers and OS developers have not worked
closely enough together to develop a best of both worlds system
[8-9]. Microprocessor hardware always leads operating system
development. We need to find simple hardware features that can
significantly reduce the amount of software required for an
operating system.
In “Separation Kernels Enable Rapid
Development of Trustworthy Systems,” Keegan [10] wrote:
“Compared to trying to separate applications in an operating
system, a separation kernel can remove roughly a million lines or
more of complex code to achieve the same capabilities.” We would
like to add < 10 % more hardware to save thousands to orders of
magnitude more lines of computer code.

2. OSFA INTRODUCTION
The OSFA architecture consists of 4 cache bank memory pipelines
connected to an instruction execution pipeline. For light-weight
threads, the on-chip cache hierarchy provides near instantaneous
context switching times. The cache banks provide fast pipelined
and parallel read and write operation to the caches while the
microprocessor’s execution pipeline is running instructions. The
cache bank controllers provide arbitration to prevent the memory
pipeline and microprocessor’s execution pipeline from accessing
the same cache bank at the same time. This separation or virtual
fence allows the cache memory pages to transfer to and from the
L1 caches while the microprocessor pipeline is executing
instructions. Figure 1 introduces the key features of the cache bank
memory pipeline architecture in the OSFA [7-9]. The cache
controller and cache banks block contains 3 groups of cache banks.
Figure 2 illustrates the OSFA microprocessor architecture. The
OSFA is an extended Harvard architecture. There are 4 cache bank
memory pipelines. The active cache bank is connected to the
microprocessor’s execution pipeline. The swapping cache bank is
connected to the DMA controller. Idle cache banks are not
connected. The cache bank controller manages the cache bank

connections. The cache bank controller manages connecting and
disconnecting cache banks from the execution pipeline and DMA
controller. The cache bank configuration allows for running a
process from the active cache bank and copying or loading a
swapping cache bank in parallel. The cache bank controller
provides for single cycle context switching. The register cache
bank pipeline and pipeline state cache bank pipeline save the
process state proving for a single cycle context switching. A more
detailed context switch description is presented in [7-9].

3. Hardware Security Framework
As illustrated in Figure 1, the OSFA’s hardware security
mechanism [6-7] consists of cache bank security headers and
memory cell permission bits (security tags) similar to Unix file
permission bits. The OSFA security architecture is divided into
access level similar to Unix protection rings. Figure 3 (left side)
shows the OSFA’s security hierarchy. The security hierarchy [9]
is a directory like structure where inside security containers, access
level n has visibility to the bottom level.
A trusted OS configures the cache bank security headers and
memory cell permission bits. The security headers and memory
cell permission bits define the limits for a hardware level sandbox.
In Figure 3, a process sends a malicious pointer to an OS DLL
function call. The malicious pointer tries to access a memory page
with cache bank header is set to RWM (Read, Write and Modify are
not allowed). A hardware level exception is raised and the trusted
OS handles the exception and cleans up the malicious process.

4. OSFA Shared Memory Examples
In Figure 4, we present some shared memory page examples for the
OSFA architecture. There are 4 processes shown as process IDs
(PID) of PID = 0x1a, 0xbc, 0x3d, and 0x41. The shared memory
page security header shows the access rights for each PID. Each
memory cell also has permission bit fields (security tags). The
shared memory operations are allowed as long as the PID has
access rights. For a process to access a memory cell, it must have
access rights in the security header and the memory cell permission
bits must allow the operation (read, write, modify, etc.). When the
PID does not have access rights (lower level diagrams), a hardware
exception occurs and is handled by the trusted OS. For example,
the process, PID = 0x41, has memory page access rights: RWM
(Read = allowed, Write and Modify = not allowed). When the
process, PID = 0x41, attempts to read the third memory cell with
permission bits RWM (Read, Write and Modify = not allowed), a
hardware level exception is raised and handled by the trusted OS.

5. FPGA Softcore Implementation Effort
In Figure 5, to evaluate and compare the OSFA to a conventional
microprocessor, we are developing a softcore OSFA
implementation based on the well-established RISC-V [11]
processor. We will use the RISC-V development tool chain
(compiler, linker, and debugger) to create code for both the
conventional CPU and OSFA processor. A benchmark suite
consisting of CPU performance tests and security tests based on
DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge efforts will be developed to
compare the OSFA to a conventional processor. We will run the
same binaries on both CPUs for an unbiased performance
comparison. We will also be developing a full system cycleaccurate simulator [12-13].

6. Conclusion
The OSFA is a step towards cybersecurity in hardware. In the past,
more resilient cyber security has required virtual machines
(hypervisors) to create execution sandboxes for untrusted software.

The OSFA uses a trusted OS to configure the hardware security
mechanism to define the bounds of the execution sandbox.
Software is allowed to run with no security overhead as long as it
does not exceed the limits of the sandbox. At run time, an operation
that exceeds the limits of the execution sandbox, instantly raises a
hardware level exception preventing the malicious process from
accessing anything outside the sandbox.
We have outlined our plans to compare the performance of the
OSFA to a conventional processor. Performance and security
testing results will be published in the future.
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Figure 1. Cache Controller and Cache Bank Memory Pipeline Architecture

Figure 2. OS Friendly Microprocessor Architecture

Figure 3. OSFA Security Hierarchy and Hardware Exception Handling.

Figure 4. OSFA Shared Memory Security

Figure 5. OSFA Softcore Development and Performance Testing

